# Implementing Snort into SURFids

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February 6, 2008


- SURFids
- 2 Snort
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- Integrating Snort
- **6** Conclusion
- Future work

## **IDS**

#### Intrusion Detection System

- Detects unwanted activity
- Host based or Network based

## **SURFids**



## Honeypots

#### Nepenthes

- Low interaction honeypot
- Simulates known vulnerabilities


#### Argos

- High interaction honeypot
- Analyses the operating system

# Nepenthes information

30-01-2008 12:17:23	Malicious attack - Nepenthes	71.83.121.44	2323	500 MF 108-100	2967	TEST	Symantec AV
30-01-2008 12:51:44	Malicious attack - Nepenthes	83.206.104.118	57578	200 MT 100 100	139	TEST	NetDDE
30-01-2008 13:00:24	Malicious attack - Nepenthes	<b>5</b> 71.147.32.143	57019	200 97 100 100	445	TEST	ASN1
30-01-2008 13:18:04	Malicious attack - Nepenthes	91.163.215.158	2958	\$50 MM 550 500	2967	TEST	Symantec AV
30-01-2008 13:19:11	Malicious attack - Nepenthes	91.171.126.127	4695	100 100 100 100	135	TEST	DCOM
30-01-2008 13:00:24	Possible malicious attack	<b>5</b> 71.147.32.143	57011	Miles of the last	445	TEST	
30-01-2008 13:18:04	Possible malicious attack	91.163.215.158	2963	\$600 MT 100 000	8555	TEST	
30-01-2008 13:18:04	Possible malicious attack	91.163.215.158	2954	200 00 100 100	2967	TEST	
30-01-2008 13:19:10	Possible malicious attack	91.171.126.127	4644	\$60 W 100 100	135	TEST	
30-01-2008 13:19:11	Possible malicious attack	91.171.126.127	4655	Section 1997 To the last of th	135	TEST	

## Argos information



Close this popup

## Snort

Network Intrusion Detection System

Rule and anomaly based

## Assignment

#### Definition

"Which implementation of Snort into SURFids gives the most added value to the customer while not degrading performance in a noticable way."

#### Research questions

- Added value of Snort?
- Where to place Snort?
- How can Snort output be integrated?

#### Performance

#### **SURFids**

- 3 Mbits constant
- 30 Mbits max peaks

#### Snort


• 125 Mbits without packet loss

## Experiments

#### Experiments

- Snort before Argos
- 2 Snort besides Argos and Nepenthes
- Snort on the tunnel server

## Experiment 1




## Results experiment 1

#### Results

- Over 90% of the attacks registered by Argos were detected by Snort
- Other attacks also recognized
- Timeskew, Multiple entries per attack


## Experiment 2



## Results experiment 2

Not conducted due to time and hardware limitations

## Experiment 3



## Results experiment 3

Over 90% of the attacks registered by Nepenthes were detected by Snort

Identification of 10% of the possible malicious attacks

## Integrating Snort

#### Barnyard, a Snort output processor

- Offloads Snort
- Supports multiple output formats
- Database aware

## Integrating Snort

# Develop a database output plugin

- Shortest path
- IP packet payload information

# Parse Comma Seperated Value output

- Relative easy to develop
- No IP packet payload informatioin

#### Conclusion

Snort provides added value to SURFids

Nepenthes possible malicious attacks can be discarded

#### Future work

Develop a program that deals with Snort output