Security analysis of Dutch smart metering systems

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


- 2 Theoretical research
- 3 Practical research
- 4 Recommendations




Smart Metering goals

- Accurate billing
- Insight in energy usage
- NTA Dutch Technical Agreement




Security analysis of Dutch smart metering systems Smart metering introduction

NTA



Your energy usage

• What do you see in this image?



Electricity Water Gas

Research objective

"Analyze the possible impact of the use of smart metering systems on the security of electricity metering using the CIA-triad and minimum requirements as stated in the NTA-8130 regulation. Compare the NTA and a preferred situation with the smart metering systems that are currently implemented."

Theoretical research

- Defined the need for security using the CIA-triad
- Analyzed the NTA security requirements:

P0	Not defined	
P1	Read-only	
P2	Encryption allowed if interoperable	
P3	Grid operator should take 'appropriate measures'	
P4	Grid operator should take 'appropriate measures'	
P5	Out of scope	

• Defined possible attack vectors based on CIA-triad

Port 0 security

- Optical interface (all meters)
- Programming buttons (some meters)
- Security measures
 - Switch behind security seal
 - Tamper detection



Port 0 security

Image: Service Tree : LGZZMF100AC_M12 *] Image: Service : LGZZMF10 *] Image: Service : LGZZMF10 *]	
Landis+Gyr MAP120 DLMS METER TOOL [Der	mo Version]
	60212 : Readout F.F(00) C.1.0(88903893) 0.0(KA2Q008890389307) C.1.1(94898007) 1.8.2(0001300.3*Kvh) 1.8.2(0001300.3*Kvh) 1.8.2(00002467,2*Kvh) 2.8.0(00002467,2*Kvh) 2.8.0(00002467,2*Kvh) 5.2.7(20014) 5.2.7(2004) 5.7

Port 2 security

- Wired
 - M-Bus without encryption
 - M-Bus interfaces widely available
 - Simulate gas or water meter (slave)
 - Simulate electricity meter (master)




- Wireless
 - Proprietary protocols
 - Wireless M-Bus not being used

Port 3 security


- Communication methods:
 - PowerLine Communication (PLC)
 - GPRS
 - Ethernet
 - Radio Frequency mesh (RF)
- Risks
 - Sniffing (Serial GPRS modem and Ethernet)
 - Disrupting communications
 - Denial of Service attacks

Port 3 security



Port 5 security

- Risks
 - Sniffing
 - Man-in-the-Middle attack
 - Shoulder surfing for credentials
 - The usual risks
- Basic security measures
 - SSL (HTTPS)
 - Strong authentication



Inloggen	
Klantnummer:	
Postcode:	
Huisnummer:	zonder toevoeging
	Inloggen 🤤
	Intoggen 🤤

Security analysis of Dutch smart metering systems Practical research


Mijn aansluitingen

Voortgang installatie

Verbruiksgegevens



Verbruiksgegevens stroom





Recommendations

NTA:

- Aggregate data per day, week or month
- More specific security requirements in NTA
- Port 0 should be part of NTA
 - Including minimal security requirements

Recommendations

Supplier and grid operators:

- Do not trust security seals
- Data availability can not be guaranteed
- Use open encryption on all links
- Do not underestimate privacy aspects
- Use SSL and strong passwords on website
- Perform data checks to verify correctness of data

Conclusion

- Privacy underestimated
- NTA not specific enough about security
- Security of meter management functions not sufficient
- No secure channel between electricity and gas or water meter
- Supplier websites should improve their security

Thanks

Thanks for your attention Any questions before enjoying your lunches?