Embedding of External Content from Non-trusted Sources

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
Agenda

- Introduction
 - Research Question
- Background
 - How to embed content?
 - Most common attacks

Results

- Testing Methods
- Possible Solutions
- Conclusions
 - Futures work
- Questions

Introduction




- Target websites
 - e-banking
 - e-commerce
- Embedded third-parties content
 - Bank partners advertising
 - Social networks
- Not all on the same trusted degree!

Introduction Research Question

- How to securely embed content from non-trusted sources on a website?
 - How to create trusted content from untrusted content?
 - Which vulnerabilities have to be secured?
 - How do different browsers handle the problem?
 - How much user intervention is required for the different solutions?
 - What can be secured by the bank server?
 - What can the bank do to secure third parties' servers?
 - What can be done to have a third party to be considered trusted?

Background How to embed content?




- Content can be included with:
 - Scripts → <script type="text/javascript">ajaxinclude ("filename.html")</script>
 - Inline frames → <iframe src=" https://www.os3.nl/"></iframe>
- What is an Iframe?
 - HTML document embedded inside another HTML document on a website
 - Behaves as an inline image, but can be configured independently from HTML content where it is embed
 - *More secure than scripts*

Background Most common attacks{1}


- Cross-site Scripting
 - OWASP Top Ten Project 2010 (A2)
- Cross-site Request Forgery
 - OWASP Top Ten Project 2010 (A5)
- Phishing
 - One of the highest visibility problems for e-banking and e-commerce websites

Background Most common attacks{2}



- Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
 - Allow attackers to execute malicious JavaScript code, pretending that the application is sending the code to the user
 - Attacker is able to execute scripts in the victims browser which can be used to hijack users sessions, among others

Background Most common attacks{3}



 Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)

- Allows an attacker to send requests on behalf of a client without knowledge or interaction from the client
- Attacker can force the victims browser to perform a hostile action, benefiting from this

Background Most common attacks{4}



• Phishing

- Good example of social engineering
- Attacker attempts to obtain informations about the user by misleading him/her
- Done by masquerading as a trustworthy entity (the bank in this case)



- Banking website simulated with some flaws
- Inclusion of tree Iframes with attacks to the website
 - **XSS attack** Session hijacking by stealing cookies
 - CSRF attack Clickable link that will do a POST request, on behalf of the user, to do a new transaction
 - **Phishing attack** Request to change the user's password
- Three web browsers tested:
 - Firefox
 - Google Chrome
 - Internet Explorer 8

Results Possible Solutions

- Web Browsers' Security
- Server-side protections
- Autommated scanners

Results Possible Solutions – Web Browsers' Security

Web browser/Attack	XSS	CSRF	Phishing
Firefox	Same-origin policy protection	Use of add-ons such as: CsFire* RequestPolicy* NoScript*	<i>Phishing Protection</i> feature*
Google Chrome	Same-origin policy protection	HTML5 JavaScript Sandbox	<i>"Enable phishing and malware protection"</i> option*
Internet Explorer 8	Same-origin policy protection		SmartScreen Filter*

* User intervention required

Results

Possible Solutions – Server-side Protection

- XSS not tested (tested web browsers handled it)
- CSRF protections
 - Filtering proxy
 - Double submit (variation of the token identification scheme)
 - Apache mod_security module (can be called web application firewall)

Phishing protections

- Nothing can be done by server-side!
- Alert costumers is the best thing to do!

Results

Possible Solutions – Automated Scanners

- Scans the website for malicious content
- It was considered, but ...
- ... cannot be considered as protection
 - Attacks can be performed in such a way that it can be misled
 - It would only function as a problem detection
- Can be a solution to transform untrusted content into trusted content
 - ... but then again it can be misled

Conclusions

- Ideally all the vulnerabilities should be protected (XSS, CSRF and Phishing most common)
- All the **tested** web browsers are protected against XSS (same-origin policy)
- Most of web browsers' features require user intervention
- Phishing is probably the most difficult vulnerability to prevent
- The use of automated scanners can be a solution to transform untrusted content into trusted content, though filtering proxies might do a better job
- CSRF difficult to be protected by web browsers, server side solutions (filtering proxies or double submit) are better
- In order to protect third parties' servers, the same protection methods used by the bank should be used
- Having third parties being audited by the bank should be enough to consider them more trustuble

Conclusions Future Work

- More web browsers tested
 - Opera
 - Safari
 - Android

More attacks tested

- Pharming
- Man-in-the-Browser (MitB)

Questions



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 - Steven Raspe
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