## The Devil is in the details Social Engineering by means of Social Media

BY

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## Introduction

## Online Social Networks

- LinkedIn (service data, disclosed data)
- Facebook (entrusted data, incidental data)
- Social Engineering
- Relevant information
- What else is new?

## **Research Questions**

How can Online Social Networks be used in the automated creation of a graphical view of the company hierarchy and its employees for the purpose of social engineering?

- How can current information gathering techniques be combined to achieve this goal?
- What are the consequences for companies?
- What can companies do to mitigate this process?

# How did we start?

#### START ON LINKEDIN

#### **CREATE FAKE PROFILE**

#### LINKEDIN TIERS

#### **GETTING CONNECTED WITH THE COMPANY**

**SEARCHING & FILTERING** 

**CRAWLING THE RESULTS** 



## Create fake profile

## • Being a member is a necessity

- Access to user profiles
- Use LinkedIn's search functionality

o Etc...

• Create a false identity with information that conforms to the target company = zombie profile

- Getting information from other users depends on the tier:
  - o 1<sup>st</sup> tier
  - o 2<sup>nd</sup> tier
  - 3<sup>th</sup> tier
  - Out of Network
- 2<sup>nd</sup> tier show enough unobfuscated information
- Need at least one 1<sup>st</sup> tier connection to get 2<sup>nd</sup> tier results

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#### LinkedIn Member Director - PMO at Walmart Fayetteville, Arkansas Area · Information Technology and Services

Send InMail 🔳 🗉

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Digital Marketing Director at Microsoft Greater Seattle Area · Information Technology and Services Similar

Send InMail 🔳 🖷 🕇

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Jan Peter Balkenende 2nd Professor at Erasmus University Rotterdam The Hague Area, Netherlands · Government Administration 1 shared connection · Similar

Connect 🔳

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 Getting information from other users depends on the tier: Daan Wagenaar (1st) Intern at KPMG Message

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- Out of Network



Amsterdam Area, Netherlands · Information Technology and 9 shared connections · Similar · 2 122

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## Getting connected with the company

• Company's "followers" list

## List of partly obfuscated names

- o Current employment
- First name + first letter of the last name
- Hyperlink to the public profile
  - × Public profile shows the full name...

# Crawl list of followers and send connection requests Once the first connection was made, the company circle was infiltrated



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## Searching & Filtering

- Searching 2<sup>nd</sup> tier connections
  - Limit of 100 search results
- Scoping the target company
   Define keywords
- Reducing the LinkedIn dataset
   Apply filters

## Crawling the results

- Final dataset was defined by the filtering process
- Our custom made crawler managed to:
  - Crawl all the names of 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> tier connections
  - Crawl all the information these profiles put on their account

# Now what?

#### **CONTINUE ON FACEBOOK**



## Why Facebook?

- Data enrichment
- Getting to user's private information
   Not found on LinkedIn

## **Profile matching**

- Unfortunately the profiles are not a 1-1 relation
- One user's name on LinkedIn can appear many times on Facebook
  - ~901 million users...
- Matching profiles just by using the name won't work
   Social synergy is the key

## **Profile matching**

• Unfortunately the profiles are not a 1-1 relation

#### Roderick de Weijert

#### CEO at SNECompany Ltd.

Rotterdam Area, Netherlands | Information Services





## When do we have a match?

• Three ways to define when we have a certain match

- **1**. Matching using public data
- 2. FLEMP
- 3. Zombie profiles

## 1) Matching using public data

• Using publicly available data on Facebook

- Can a match be found?
  - Same name, current employment, education, location, etc...

## 2) FLEMP

"Friend List of Earlier Matched Profiles"
• Why can this work?

• Search through the publicly available friend lists

 Compares names found in these lists to names of unidentified profiles in our dataset

• If a match is found, the profiles match

## 3) Zombie Profiles

- Use zombie profiles to spam friendship requests
  - When search returns multiple names and no match can be made
  - Spam friendship requests to all those profiles
- If the user accepts the friendship request
  - o Crawl the data
  - Try to make a match with private data that is now accessible

## How do we get the data?

## • Public crawling

• Collect all the information that is publicly available

## Zombie Profiles

Shotgun approach – friend as many people as possible
Undirected

### iCloner

- o Surgical approach
- Directed

## iCloner

- Take profile from one social network
- See if it doesn't exist on the other social network
- Clone his details onto that social network
- Try to connect to his connections
- From LinkedIn → Facebook

# Which results did we get?

## Time

- 1 day of connecting
- 1 day of crawling
- Resulted in...

## LinkedIn Zombie Profile

- 106 invitations sent
- 39 accepted
- 36.7%



Two degrees away Friends of friends; each connected to one of your connections

11,400+

## Defining the final dataset on LinkedIn

- First filtering: 286 profiles
  - Conformed to our initial search on the company
  - All information crawled
- 125 profiles were matched on Facebook
   43%
- After final filtering: 86 profiles defined on LinkedIn
  - o 37 on Facebook
  - Another 9 found using FLEMP
  - o o found by using Zombie Profiles
  - o 46 Facebook profiles in total
  - <mark>0 55</mark>%





## Matching the information – Social Synergy



#### Fields used for profile matching in %

- Current Employment, Education
- Current Employment, Education, Living location
- Found in Friend List of Earlier Matched Profiles (FLEMP)
- Exact profile picture
- Education, Past education
- FLEMP, Current Employment, Education
- Current Employment, Single result found
- Education, Living location
- Education, Living location
- Current Employment
- FLEMP, Living Location
- Likes, Living location
- Past, education, Living location

## **Zombie Profiles and iCloner**

### Zombie Profiles

o 200 friendship requests sent

- o 13 accepted
- **6.5%**

## iCloner

- o 10 friendship requests sent
- o 6 accepted
- **o 60%**
- o 4 friendship requests received

# What does it all mean?

## Job function parsing

- Parse sub-departments in the targeted department
- Parse job function per sub-departments
- Assign weight to function
- Sort based on weight



# DEMO

# Why is this useful?

## Information gathering

- <u>More</u> data can be gathered <u>faster</u>
- Data is automatically sorted
- Hierarchical structure of a company becomes visible
- Allows for social engineers to create attack scenarios easier

## Creating a bond of trust

- Try and build a bond of trust with the target
  - Hey, I heard you just went on a holiday, how was it?
    - Of course you know the target went on a holiday because you saw his Facebook wall posts...
  - I heard from a colleague you bought a new book, how is it?
    - × You know the colleague because you created a hierarchy of the company that puts them in the same function
    - × But in fact you just crawled the Facebook wall
- Get the target to tell you information that he/she would otherwise have never told you

## Try and build • Hey, I heard yo × Of course you his Facebook • I heard from a × You know the company that × But in fact you

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Peter Olsthoorn

## Creating a false sense of authority

• Reference persons placed higher in the company hierarchy

- Boss X just told me he needs access to those files, can you mail them to me?
- Create a false sense of authority
- Incline the target to comply faster to the social engineer

# What can companies do?

#### **MITIGATION**

## **Creating Policies**

• Prevent social synergy

• Don't put your work or education details on Facebook

Reduce the effect of data gathering techniques
Set the right privacy settings on Facebook data
Verify that who you friend is that actual person

• Be generic on LinkedIn

• Omit exact job function and department?

## Generating user awareness

- Periodic testing of publicly available data
- Perform awareness sessions with concrete examples from our research

# Conclusions

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## Conclusion

• How can current information gathering techniques be combined to achieve our goal?

- Zombie profiles
- o iCloning technique
- Efficient matching

## • What are the consequences for companies?

- Gathering data becomes easier and faster for social engineers
- Social engineering attacks can be created easier
- The company hierarchy can be visualized
- What can companies do to mitigate this process?
  - Create company policies for social media usage
  - o Generate user awareness

## **Conclusion continued**

- Creating a visualized hierarchy of a company and its employees in an automatic way is possible
   Automated
  - o Fast
- Allowed by the wealth of information that is available online
- People are generally not aware at how much information they share online and how easy it is to get access to it – if you really want it

# Questions?

#### THANK YOU