

StealthWare – Social Engineering Malware

Running malware for Social Engineering and
Covert Operations

By: Joey Dreijer

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Social Engineering and Covert Operations

Security companies provide specialised Social Engineering services

A few examples:

- (Spear) Phishing attacks: Sending falsified e-mails to individuals and/or entire companies
- USB Drop campaigns: Who doesn't want free USB sticks?
- Advanced pentest campaigns: From gathering intel to physical penetration at client facilities

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Social Engineering and Covert Operations

So your client asks you to perform a social engineering test / covert ops assignment to gain access to their network, what now?

- *How far can you go?*
- *What methodology will you use?*
- *What is your entry point?*
- *What overly priced framework will you use?*

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Having the right framework

Is it possible to 'stealthy' (and effectively) use social engineering malware for specialized security assessments?

- What existing tools are out there?
- What network/security policies will you often find on company premises?
- Can these policies be bypassed?
- Can the researched tools effectively cope with the different network architectures?

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Having the right toolkit

Research focus on the limitations of existing tools



vs.



vs.



vs.



Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection


Conclusion

NO FOCUS ON EXPLOITATION*

*At least, only at minimal level

Testing environment

- Infect virtual client
- Communicate with CnC server
- On-site locations with different network configurations



Introduction

Research

Approach


Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Testing environment



Field testing reachability

Campus networks

University labs (Proxy networks)

Open Wifi points (captive portals)

Restaurants (semi-open networks)

Company networks (ie. unauth proxies)

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Common network configurations

Testing different network configurations:

- Clients behind a captive portal
- Clients behind an unauthorized proxy
- Clients behind an authorized proxy

And different firewall policies:

- **Open Internet:** Everything is allowed (out)
- **Limited access:** Port 80/443 (Web), 53 (DNS) and IMAP/SMTP (143, 25) are allowed. Everything else is blocked
- **Web-Only:** Only allowing 80/443 for 'daily' browsing and internal DNS

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion


Command and control



1. Client infected via e-mail social engineering campaign

2. Client 'beacons' command and control server to ask for queued commands

3. Server replies with task or 'None'



Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Command and control channels

| | Cobalt Strike* | ThrowBack ~Nyan** | ThrowBack |
|--------------|---------------------|-----------------------|-----------|
| HTTP | Yes | No | No |
| HTTPS | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| DNS | Yes (TXT+A Records) | Yes (RRSIG+A Records) | No |
| Social Media | No | Yes (Twitter Stego) | No |

* Only taking current default channels into account

** Proof-of-concept malware client based on ThrowBack backend.

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion


Effectiveness

None of the default clients have 'fallback' methods :(
*ie. No HTTP access? Try HTTPS. No HTTPS? Try DNS.
No DNS? Try smoke signals*

Requires prior knowledge of the network and/or 'HTTP is probably open anyway' statistical knowledge

Current proof-of-concept attempts to find a way out autonomously

Effectiveness proof-of-concept



Automatically attempt channel 1 and increment after failed attempts

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Effectiveness (with prior-knowledge)

| Network Config | Cobalt Strike | ThrowBack ~Nyan | ThrowBack |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Unauth Proxy | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Auth Proxy | Yes | Yes | Yes (but buggy) |
| Captive Portal (with DNS allowed) | No | Yes | No |

Both Cobalt Strike and Throwback (Nyan) are able to get the current Windows configured proxy settings.

TODO: Still creating/visiting environments to test reachability. Full 'documented' details in report later

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Detectability

Beacon detection in PCAP Files – L. van Duijn (OS3, 2014): Proof of Concept code, beacon detection still not 'ready' for realtime analysis

SSL Stripping + DPI (a la Blue Coat): Running appliances as Blue Coat with SSL stripping

Domain 'trust' index: Monitor 'trusted' domains and analyse domain structures (ie. Runforestrunabcd.omgthisunique1928481.ru)

Anomaly detection: Ex. Beacons during the night, lunch and/or Fussball session

Static Signatures: Only available for 'known' malware. But not for ThrowBack and Cobalt Strike yet?!

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking


Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Detectability

'Hindsight' methodology: Virus Scanners / IDS systems don't detect standard beaoning. Metasploit interpreter sessions on the other hand...



Developed SNORT
(2.9+3.0Alpha) IDS Signatures
for Cobalt Strike and ThrowBack
HTTPS

1. Specific traffic behaviour
2. Standard response sizes

Available in the report

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Detectability – Simple IDS example

Cobalt Strike HTTPS channel:

- Server response size always the same
- Client always RESETS connection (instead of ack/fin)

| | | | | |
|----------------|----------------|---------|-----|--|
| 172.20.10.14 | 145.100.105.99 | TCP | 66 | 49173→443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=25... |
| 145.100.105.99 | 172.20.10.14 | TCP | 66 | 443→49173 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=29200 Len=0 MS... |
| 172.20.10.14 | 145.100.105.99 | TCP | 54 | 49173→443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=66048 Len=0 |
| 172.20.10.14 | 145.100.105.99 | TLSv1.2 | 244 | Client Hello |
| 145.100.105.99 | 172.20.10.14 | TCP | 54 | 443→49173 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=191 Win=30336 Len=0 |
| 145.100.105.99 | 172.20.10.14 | TLSv1.2 | 140 | Server Hello |
| 172.20.10.14 | 145.100.105.99 | TCP | 54 | 49173→443 [ACK] Seq=191 Ack=87 Win=66048 Len=0 |
| 145.100.105.99 | 172.20.10.14 | TLSv1.2 | 161 | Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message |
| 172.20.10.14 | 145.100.105.99 | TCP | 54 | 49173→443 [ACK] Seq=191 Ack=194 Win=65792 Len=0 |
| 172.20.10.14 | 145.100.105.99 | TLSv1.2 | 161 | Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message |
| 172.20.10.14 | 145.100.105.99 | TLSv1.2 | 523 | Application Data |
| 145.100.105.99 | 172.20.10.14 | TCP | 54 | 443→49173 [ACK] Seq=194 Ack=767 Win=31360 Len=0 |
| 145.100.105.99 | 172.20.10.14 | TLSv1.2 | 251 | Application Data |
| 145.100.105.99 | 172.20.10.14 | TLSv1.2 | 139 | Encrypted Alert |
| 172.20.10.14 | 145.100.105.99 | TCP | 54 | 49173→443 [ACK] Seq=767 Ack=477 Win=65536 Len=0 |
| 172.20.10.14 | 145.100.105.99 | TCP | 54 | 49173→443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=767 Ack=477 Win=65536 Len=0 |
| 172.20.10.14 | 145.100.105.99 | TCP | 54 | 49173→443 [RST, ACK] Seq=768 Ack=477 Win=0 Len=0 |
| 145.100.105.99 | 172.20.10.14 | TCP | 54 | 443→49173 [ACK] Seq=477 Ack=768 Win=31360 Len=0 |

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Bypassing limited detection

Improving ThrowBack and creating NYAN Edition

1. Randomize content (length) request and response
2. Random beacon timers (ie. Set time + 1% - 80%)
3. Multiple 'bogus' sessions to prevent specific behavior signatures
4. DNS: Base64 in TXT records is an old trick. Put your data in a valid RRSIG format for compliancy!
5. *Using trusted channels/domains for Command and Control*

StealthWare – Social Engineering Malware

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion



TWEETS 2 VOLGERS 1

StealthWare CnC 🔒

@stealthware_c1

All your base are belong to us

📍 The land of OOO

📷 Foto's en video's



Tweets Tweets en antwoorden Foto's en video's



StealthWare CnC @stealthware_c1 🔒 · 7 sec.
response GOMISJXSgp



Foto weergeven



StealthWare CnC @stealthware_c1 🔒 · 8 sec.
request GOMISJXSgp



StealthWare – Social Engineering Malware

Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion



Introduction

Research

Approach

Networking

Reachability

Detection

Conclusion

Conclusion

Not many frameworks available (and commercial)

Cobalt Strike works in most scenarios (with prior-knowledge)

Network detection can be very easy, depending on the monitoring tools made available (remember hindsight?)

Current proof-of-concept bypassing common detection and network limitations. **Good** anomaly detection still rare

WIP code available on GitHub to test real-life monitoring capabilities