

Formal verification of the implementation of the MQTT protocol in IoT devices

Kristiyan Mladenov

University of Amsterdam
Faculty of Physics, Mathematics and Informatics
MSc System and Network Engineering
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Introduction

- Mirai botnet producing one of the largest DDoS attacks ever.
- We can also talk about botnet "wars".
- Compromise due to human error.

IoT testing

- Rapid7 IoT Security Testing Methodology
- OWASP IoT Top 10
- IoT Inspector (SEC Technologies)

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What would happen if we dig deeper?


- One of the main goals of the IoT devices is to exchange data using some message exchange mechanism.
- How can we assure a proper protocol implementation?
- Could we make sure that it is correct in a more formal way?

Protocol of choice

MQTT

Message Queue Telemetry Transport

- Designed for message transfer with small code footprint and limited bandwidth in mind.
- First version was available in 1999. Version 3.1.1 is standardised by OASIS (2014) and ISO (2016).




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- Publish/Subscribe communication mechanism similar to IRC.
- Adds the concept of Last Will and QoS.



MQTT use cases

MQTT is implemented in:

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Applications that use MQTT

- Fitness trackers, Medical equipment, ATM machines
- Implemented by Deutsche Bahn (DB)
- Facebook Messenger (Unconfirmed)

Research Question

Can the MQTT protocol implementation in IoT devices be verified formally?

Subquestions

- What methods can be used to formally assess the implementation of a communication protocol?
- Using the chosen formal testing methods, does the MQTT implementation in certain selected IoT devices adhere to the standard?

Related Work

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- ISO/IEC 9646 - Conformance testing methodology and framework.

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- Mapping TTCN to Labelled Transition Systems.

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- The testing to follow is focused on Eclipse Titan.

MQTT Packet Structure




Figure: MQTT Packet structure

Example test

[MQTT-2.3.1-1]

SUBSCRIBE, UNSUBSCRIBE, and PUBLISH (in cases where QoS>0) Control Packets MUST contain a non-zero 16-bit Packet Identifier.




Figure: Publish with Packet ID 0




Figure: Test execution flowgraph

Room for improvement

*Writing is nature's way of letting you know how sloppy your thinking is.*¹

¹Dick Guidon

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- Translating a specification from natural to formal language is prone to errors.
- How can we safely come up with new values for the tests?
- If the specification is defined in a formal language, testing might be easier.

¹Dick Guidon

Intermezzo

The Die Hard challenge²

- You have two buckets
 - 3 litres
 - 5 litres
- You have an infinite amount of water.
- You can waste as much water as you want.
- How do you fill the large bucket with exactly 4 litres?

²[https:](https://github.com/tlaplus/Examples/tree/master/specifications/DieHard)

[//github.com/tlaplus/Examples/tree/master/specifications/DieHard](https://github.com/tlaplus/Examples/tree/master/specifications/DieHard)

Intermezzo approach (enter TLA+)

Intermezzo approach (enter TLA+)

EXTENDS *Integers*

VARIABLES *small, big*

$TypeOK \triangleq \wedge small \in 0..3$
 $\wedge big \in 0..5$

$Init \triangleq \wedge big = 0$
 $\wedge small = 0$

$FillSmall \triangleq \wedge small' = 3$
 $\wedge big' = big$

$FillBig \triangleq \wedge big' = 5$
 $\wedge small' = small$

$EmptySmall \triangleq \wedge small' = 0$
 $\wedge big' = big$

$EmptyBig \triangleq \wedge big' = 0$
 $\wedge small' = small$

$SmallToBig \triangleq$ IF $big + small \leq 5$
THEN $\wedge big' = big + small$
 $\wedge small' = 0$
ELSE $\wedge big' = 5$
 $\wedge small' = small - (5 - big)$

$BigToSmall \triangleq$ IF $big + small \leq 3$
THEN $\wedge big' = 0$
 $\wedge small' = big + small$
ELSE $\wedge big' = small - (3 - big)$
 $\wedge small' = 3$

$Next \triangleq \vee FillSmall$
 $\vee FillBig$
 $\vee EmptySmall$
 $\vee EmptyBig$
 $\vee SmallToBig$
 $\vee BigToSmall$

TLA+ model of a simple MQTT keepalive

- Define different invariant in the TLA+ model checker.
- Observe the behaviour of the model; relax constraints if necessary.
- Map the observed behaviour in terms of TTCN-3 tests.
- The problem of translating natural to formal language is still not solved.

```
EXTENDS Naturals, TLC

VARIABLES srvMsg, clMsg, pc

vars  $\hat{=}$   $\langle$  srvMsg, clMsg, pc  $\rangle$ 

Init  $\hat{=}$   $\wedge$  srvMsg  $\in$  0 .. 15
       $\wedge$  clMsg  $\in$  0 .. 15
       $\wedge$  pc = "Initial"

Initial  $\hat{=}$   $\wedge$  pc = "Initial"
           $\wedge$  clMsg' = 0
           $\wedge$  srvMsg' = 0
           $\wedge$  pc' = "Sendping"

Sendping  $\hat{=}$   $\wedge$  pc = "Sendping"
            $\wedge$  clMsg' = 12
            $\wedge$  srvMsg' = 0
            $\wedge$  pc' = "Sendresp"

Sendresp  $\hat{=}$   $\wedge$  pc = "Sendresp"
           $\wedge$  IF clMsg = 12
              THEN  $\wedge$  srvMsg' = 13
              ELSE  $\wedge$  srvMsg' = 16
           $\wedge$  clMsg' = 0
           $\wedge$  pc' = "Done"

Next  $\hat{=}$  Initial  $\vee$  Sendping  $\vee$  Sendresp
       $\vee$  (pc = "Done"  $\wedge$  UNCHANGED vars)

Spec  $\hat{=}$  Init  $\wedge$   $\square$ [Next]vars

Termination  $\hat{=}$   $\diamond$ (pc = "Done")
```

Figure: TLA+ simplified keepalive

Results

What follows is a list of the normative requirements and how do the tested implementations conform to them.

Normative Requirements

	2.2.2	2.3.1-1	3.1.0-1a	3.1.0-1b	3.1.0-2	3.1.2-2	3.1.2-24	3.1.3-8	3.3.1-4	3.6.1-1	3.8.1-1	3.8.3-4	3.12.4-1
Mosquitto	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Emqtt	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓
RabbitMQ	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓

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Mosquitto	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Emqtt	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✓
RabbitMQ	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓

Conclusion

- There are plenty of ways to model the implementation of a communication protocol, using Finite State Machines, Labelled Transition Systems, even Set Theory and First Order Logic.

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- Those inconsistencies can be used to fingerprint and identify implementations.

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- Those inconsistencies can be used to fingerprint and identify implementations.

As a side note, adhering to the standard does not mean that a device is secure, especially in the cases of bad protocol design.

Future work

- Building a complete TLA+ model could be able to identify additional behavioural differences between different implementations.
- The output derived from the TLA+ model might be used for fuzzing.
- It could also help in identifying deficiencies in the protocol design itself, rendering all implementations vulnerable.

Questions?

Share your thoughts?

References

- Image depicting the interaction between the MQTT Client and Server taken from:
<http://www.hivemq.com/blog/mqtt-essentials-part2-publish-subscribe>
- Representative solution to the Die Hard problem taken from:
<https://github.com/tlaplus/Examples/tree/master/specifications/DieHard>