Machine Learning Based Intrusion and Anomaly Detection for SCADA

Improving current models with case specific information

What is SCADA?

SCADA = Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition










Bottle Filling Factory



Storm Surge Barriers






Source: Obregon, L. (2015). Secure architecture for industrial control systems. SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room.

Some Terminology

- I/O Input / Output signals
 - Commonly used term to refer to the signals related to the system
 - Analogue or Digital
- Cycle Time or Scan Time
 - How often the devices within the system are scanned by the control device
 - Expressed in Hz
 - Multiple different frequencies can be in SCADA simultaneously
- The HMI -> PLC -> Device relationship

Process Types


1. Self Regulating Processes



Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_theory

Process Types

2. Sequential Processes



Relevance of Research

- Main priority of SCADA systems is availability
- Systems are often old
- Tailor made solutions are necessary but how?
 - Standard security products can't provide all encompassing protection
 - Most attacks are conducted from the internal layers
- Damage can be significant
 - Stuxnet (2010), Ukraine (2015), New York Dam (2016), Kemuri Water
 Company (2016)

Related Work

- 1. Fovino et al State based intrusion detection system, 2010
- 2. Wool and Goldenberg DFA based IDS, 2013
- 3. Caselli et al Sequence aware detection, 2015
- 4. Wool and Goldenberg DFA based multi layered IDS, 2017
- 5. Boukema and Lahaye Comparison of ML Algorithms, 2017
- 6. Bengio et al NN/HMM Hybrid 1995
- 7. Alex Graves Supervised Sequence Labelling, 2012

Research Questions

"What information can be used to complement the information generated by ML algorithms, to improve the efficiency and accuracy of a ML based IADS, and make it useful for sequential and non-sequential processes?"

"How can this information be best combined with the ML algorithm?"


Machine Learning Terminology


DTMM - Discrete Time Markov Chains

Similar to FSM (Finite State Machines)

Neural Networks

- LSTM Long Short Term Memory
- HMM Hidden Markov Models
- Commonly used for image recognition
- SVM K-Means Clustering
- Hybrid Models





0.3

Problem Definition

- Most focus is on sequential anomaly detection
- Hybrid Machine Learning systems are effective, but not applied to the field of IDS for SCADA
- Researches are difficult to reproduce
 - test environments vary

"Finally, it is worth noting that leveraging semantic of ICS communications and parameters is a powerful way to enhance security tools' knowledge of the environment in which they are deployed and, therefore, improve their effectiveness." - Caselli et al, 2015

Defining the "Full Knowledge"

- From the research of Fovino et al.
 - Device names, device type, possible states + fault tolerance
- Previous experience and discussions
 - O I/O list should be available?
 - Known sequences, logic diagrams?
 - Length of sequences?
 - Logical groups?
 - Causal relationships?
 - Process types?

Distilled List

- Exclude what can be learned through sniffing
 - Digital or Analogue
 - Protocol
 - Sequences
 - Process types
- Include what can't be learned
 - List of signals
 - Logical Groups / Correlations
 - Error threshold for analogue
 - Age of equipment
 - Irrelevant Information display values, not in logic

Improvements Proposed

- Analyse Traffic Based on Logical Relationships
- Combine Different Machine Learning Models
 - Learn the characteristics of sequential processes
 - Learn the characteristics of non-sequential processes
- Correlate the Gathered Data
- Enable Features Dynamically, As-Needed

The Model


I/O List

Logical Groups

Learned Sequences


Correlate Information

- Record Time Delta between states
- Record "In same state" time
- Feed this to a neural network with related information



Test Environment

- Modbus based
- Simple logic
 - Tank full -> valve opens
 - Flow control in the middle
- Reproducible
- Portable
- Other protocols ???




Logical Groups

Correlations:


o G1D - G2A

o G1A - G1D

o G2A - G2D



Virtuaplant on Siemens S7



Test Results Summary

Time-In-State correlated with

analogue process values

Valve Feedback with Good Flow and Fast Flow

Time Delta between states only for condition monitoring

 SVM seems to be the best model to find outliers 40 30 20 10 35 40 45 50 Valve Open (s)

Further tests and comparisons are required

Research Results

Useful Information

- Signal list
- Logical groups
- Equipment age
- Error threshold

Hybrid IADS Model

- Some contextual information required, generic otherwise
- Covers both sequential and non-sequential processes

Correlation Model

- Time delta describes equipment response time
- Time spent in state is more useful

Produced Artefacts

- Modular Python API
 - o I/O Parser
 - Data Objects: ModbusObject, System State
 - Modbus Packet Dissector: based on pyshark / wireshark
 - Statechart Builder with Logical Groups
- Portable, Expandable Test Environment
- Allows Easy Reproduction
- Allows Different Models to be tested

Future Work

- Performance Tests and Comparisons
 - Experiment with LSTM, HMM and SVM
- Find Further Correlations in Realistic Scenarios
- Fine Tune API for Performance
- Implement S7Object and Dissector Test on Siemens S7
- Tests on Real Systems with Realistic Scenarios

References

1st slide picture sources:

- http://www.rainbird.com/landscape/products/flowsensors/flowSensors.htm
- http://www.ascendant-technologies.com/direct-gas-systems/
- https://www.conrad.com/ce/en/product/197854/Siemens-6AV6647-0AA11-3AX0-SIMATIC-KT P400-HMI-Basic-Panel-Resolution-320-x-240-pix-Interfaces-1-x-RJ45-Ethernet-for-P
- https://uk.rs-online.com/web/p/plc-cpus/8624461/

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3nd slide picture source:

http://www.amusingplanet.com/2014/04/the-netherlands-impressive-storm-surge.html

Questions

